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The Red Fox Tavern Trial and the Evidence Act 
Dr Anna High, University of Otago, on an important series of pre-trial 
admissibility decisions 
INTRODUCTION   
In 1987, a Labour Weekend hold-up at a pub off State Highway 2 in Maramarua left the tavern’s 
publican dead after standing up to face two armed and masked intruders. The offenders escaped 
from the Red Fox Tavern with cash and cheques valued at over $36,000. Almost 30 years later, in 
August 2017, two men were arrested, and they now await trial. Aside from the obvious importance 
for the victim’s whanau in potentially bringing his killers to face delayed justice, the Red Fox 
Tavern trial is significant for a number of High Court and Court of Appeal pre-trial decisions that 
have been issued dealing with various admissibility questions and points of evidence law.  
In R v Hoggart [2019] NZCA 89 (hereafter “the joint appeal”), the Court heard four appeals 
from six pre-trial rulings in two judgments (R v Hoggart [2018] NZHC 1416 and R v W [2018] 
NZHC 2457) concerning various items of propensity, hearsay and informant evidence. In W 
(CA226/19) v R [2019] NZCA 558 (hereafter W v R), the Court of Appeal heard appeals from two 
pre-trial admissibility rulings, the first, ruling admissible evidence obtained under a search warrant 
executed on W’s home in 1988 (R v W [2019] NZHC 981); the second, ruling admissible 
statements made by W to the police in January 1988 (R v W [2019] NZHC 927).  
In these two rulings, the Court sets out important analysis regarding a number of aspects of 
evidence law, including: the linkage/coincidence concepts that underpin the admission of 
propensity evidence in the context of high societal crime rates (Evidence Act 2006, s 40); the 
meaning of “probative value” for the purpose of a s 8 exclusion analysis, including the relevance 
of reliability and delay in making the assessment; defendant statements contained within hearsay 
statements (ss 27 and 17); the reliability of prison informants; and the causation element of an 
“unfairly obtained” evidence claim (s 30). 
 
FACTS 
W and Mark Hoggart are jointly charged with aggravated robbery and murder for the 1987 hold-
up. The Crown’s case at trial will be that the tavern staff were gathered in the lounge area having 
a drink, when two gunmen entered and announced a hold-up. When the victim, publican 
Christopher Bush, stood to face the intruders, he was shot in the chest and died instantly. The co-
defendants were suspects in the investigation that ensued, but were not charged until almost 30 
years later. The trial will turn on the identity of the two gunmen, with the Crown’s case based on 
circumstantial evidence supported by propensity evidence and multiple informants’ evidence of 
admissions.  
 
JOINT APPEAL: PROPOSED PROPENSITY EVIDENCE AND LINKAGE/COINCIDENCE 
W had previously been convicted for the aggravated robbery of another tavern, the Birkenhead 
Licensing Trust. During police questioning, W stated that he thought the Fox River modus 
operandi “was the same MO as the Birkenhead Tavern job” and therefore expected to be a suspect 
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(the joint appeal at [29]). One issue in the joint appeal was whether Jagose J in the High Court was 
correct to exclude, as propensity evidence, W’s Birkenhead conviction.  
At the relevant time (late 1980s), armed robberies of retail outlets were “rife”, with Auckland 
reporting on average three armed robberies a month (at [22]). Counsel for W submitted that the 
Birkenhead robbery was “garden variety” given the rampant number of Auckland robberies 
occurring at the time, and as such there was not sufficient linkage with the Red Fox robbery (at 
[27]). However, in its analysis, the Court of Appeal was able to identify a number of “distinctive 
and unusual features” shared by the two robberies (at [27]). Importantly, these common features 
were not, in the Court of Appeal’s assessment, undermined by the significant “singular feature” of 
the Red Fox job (the accompanying murder) (at [27]–[30]). 
 
JOINT APPEAL: PROBATIVE VALUE, RELIABILITY AND DELAY 
The Court of Appeal considered the admissibility of evidence to be given by eight Crown 
witnesses, five of whom were imprisoned with one or both defendants (at [70]–[153]). 
Admissibility was governed by ss 7 and 8 only, with no particular reliability tests to be applied. 
However, there are well-known concerns regarding the credibility and reliability of prison 
informant evidence. Moreover, the informants’ evidence in this instance was of defendant 
statements allegedly made decades earlier. In this context, the Court of Appeal set out an important 
in-principle discussion about credibility, reliability and delay as factors in the s 8 balancing 
exercise, posing two questions (at [73]): 
 
[1] In assessing the probative value of evidence for the purposes of admissibility, 
can the credibility of the witness and the reliability of the evidence be considered, 
or must it be taken at its highest on the assumption the jury will accept the evidence?   
[and 2] Can delay be relevant in assessing the reliability of the evidence or any 
unfair prejudice that might be occasioned by its admission or must it be dealt with 
by judicial direction rather than exclusion? 
 
Under the s 8 general exclusionary rule, evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or needlessly prolonging the proceedings. However, the 
meaning of “probative value” is contested. The Court set out commentary and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence supporting reliability as a factor relevant to the probative value assessment 
(Elisabeth McDonald and Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act and Analysis (Thomson 
Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV8.02]; R v Bain [2009] NZSC 16, [2010] 1 NZLR 1; and Morgan 
v R [2010] NZSC 23, [2010] 2 NZLR 508 as cited in the joint appeal at [74]–[75]). However, in a 
footnote in R v Wichman [2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753, Elias CJ expressed “some doubt 
whether s 8 is concerned with reliability of evidence, as opposed to its materiality as a matter of 
proof” and proposed that “[s]ince a confession is highly probative in the latter sense … the scope 
for application of the balance indicated in s 8 may be circumscribed in the case of an inculpatory 
statement” (at [196], n 176). By contrast, Glazebrook J, in her separate dissenting judgment, stated 
that the probative value assessment “must encompass reliability”, because “[a] statement of 
dubious reliability must be less probative than one of obvious reliability” (at [530], n 680) (the 
majority did not address the issue directly).  
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Importantly, the High Court of Australia recently adopted an approach consistent with Elias 
CJ’s position in Wichman, after considering divergent views of appeal courts in Victoria and New 
South Wales (the Victorian court had held that reliability forms part of the probative value 
assessment; the New South Wales court, by majority, rejected that approach) (IMM v The Queen 
[2016] HCA 14, (2016) 257 CLR 300). The Court, preferring the New South Wales approach, 
concluded that “[the] inquiry [as to probative value] must be approached … on the assumption that 
the jury will accept the evidence”, it being impractical for the trial judge to assess credibility or 
reliability at the point of admissibility (IMM at [49]).  
After canvassing this debate, the Court of Appeal concluded that generally inculpatory 
evidence will not be ruled inadmissible under s 8 purely on the grounds of reliability, the 
assessment of reliability and credibility being “quintessentially the jury’s task” unless a specific 
threshold reliability test applies (eg ss 18, 28, 43, 45 and 46) (the joint appeal at [79]). However, 
as gatekeeper, and in “exceptional cases” involving “serious and obvious concerns about … 
reliability or … credibility”, the Judge may take reliability into account in the s 8 balancing 
exercise (at [80]). 
As for the more specific issue of delay and s 8 balancing, the Court found that while delay 
may have a bearing on both reliability and unfair prejudice, there is no general rule that delay on 
its own is sufficient to justify exclusion: “The issue is generally dealt with by judicial warning 




Although “probative value” has frequently been associated with consideration of the evidence’s 
“likely accuracy and reliability” (McDonald and Optican (eds), above, at [EV8.02]), the Court of 
Appeal makes clear that the emphasis should ordinarily be on materiality (degree of relevance, as 
opposed to the mere relevance test in s 7), with reliability only a s 8 factor in exceptional cases 
(the joint appeal at [75] and [79]–[80]). This is an important point, given the conflicting opinions 
of Elias CJ and Glazebrook J in Wichman. It also accords with the Supreme Court’s approach to 
“cellmate confession” evidence in Hudson v R [2011] NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289, in which it 
declined to create a presumptive rule of inadmissibility for unreliability (at [36]). The Court 
reasoned that “the legislative scheme as a whole is indicative of a legislative intention that 
reliability decisions ought to be made by a properly cautioned jury” (at [36]). 
 Leave to appeal on the prison informant testimony issue was granted by the Supreme Court 
in W (SC38/2019) v R [2019] NZSC 64. The Supreme Court will also hear a post-conviction appeal 
on prison informant testimony from Roigard v R [2019] NZCA 8. However, the Supreme Court 
made it clear in granting leave, in both instances, that it will not be revisiting Hudson’s rejection 
of a presumptive rule of inadmissibility for prison informant evidence (W (SC38/2019) at [2]; and 
Roigard v R [2019] NZSC 63 at [3].  
  
JOINT APPEAL: DEFENDANT STATEMENTS WITHIN HEARSAY STATEMENTS 
In addition to the eight informants referenced above, there was a ninth person who claimed to have 
heard W and Mr Hoggart make incriminating statements about the Red Fox hold-up – Ross 
Appelgren. Like many of the other informants, Mr Appelgren claimed to have heard these 
statements while in prison. Mr Appelgren is now deceased, and the Crown wished to rely on 
hearsay statements made by him to Detective Patterson (also deceased) and summarised in the 
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Detective’s four-page typewritten jobsheet. These hearsay statements included inculpatory 
statements attributed to W and Mr Hoggart. In the joint appeal, the Court considered the 
admissibility of the jobsheet, which raised the issue of defendant statements contained within a 
hearsay statement. 
In the lower court, the Crown submitted, and Woolford J accepted, that the admissibility of 
the jobsheet was governed by s 27 of the Act (“Defendants’ statements offered by prosecution”), 
to the extent that it recorded words allegedly spoken by W and Mr Hoggart (R v W [2018] NZHC 
2457 at [35]–[39] and [48]; and the joint appeal at [39]). In accordance with s 27(3), the hearsay 
rules, therefore, did not apply.  
On appeal, the Court found the hearsay rules did apply, despite s 27(3), to defendants’ 
statements contained in a statement that is itself hearsay (the joint appeal at [50]). The initial 
inquiry, therefore, should have been into whether the circumstances in relation to Mr Appelgren’s 




The Court’s line of reasoning is not supported by the wording of s 27(3) alone, which clearly 
provides that the hearsay evidence rules, other than s 22A, do not apply to evidence of a 
defendant’s statement offered by the prosecution. However, a literal application of s 27(3) to 
defendant statements contained within a hearsay statement gives rise to policy concerns, leading 
the Court to take a purposive approach to interpreting s 27 (see the joint appeal at [49]–[51]). 
As noted by the Court, if Mr Appelgren were alive to give evidence, his reporting of the 
alleged words of W and Mr Hoggart would not be hearsay, and would be governed by s 27 alone 
(at [49]). However, the s 28 rule against unreliable defendant statements would not be an 
applicable safeguard against any reliability concerns. As noted by the Supreme Court in Hudson, 
that section addresses the circumstances in which a statement is made, and “is not engaged by … 
situation[s] where the primary controversy is … as to whether the statements were in fact ever 
made” (emphasis added) (at [36]). Accordingly, the main safeguard against any possible 
unreliability of Mr Appelgren’s account would be cross-examination (a s 122 warning would also 
be appropriate).  
Because Mr Appelgren is deceased, the safeguard of cross-examination is unavailable, and 
the Court concluded that, as a result, “the reliability threshold for the admission of the hearsay 
statement of Mr Appelgren … under s 18 must be met” (the joint appeal at [50]). This is an 
important clarification to the operation of s 27 to defendant statements contained within a third 
party’s hearsay statements.  
 
JOINT APPEAL AND W v R: THE RELIABILITY OF PRISON INFORMANT EVIDENCE 
Joint Appeal: Hearsay Reliability 
 
Moving on to consider the reliability of Mr Appelgren’s hearsay statement (s 18), the Court 
surveyed research and case law from Australia, the Privy Council, Canada, the United States and 
New Zealand, finding prison informant evidence to be inherently unreliable and a leading cause 
of wrongful convictions (at [52]–[55]). Indeed, the Evidence Act (ss 122(2)(c) and 122(2)(d)) itself 
categorises such evidence as “a special category of potentially unreliable evidence requiring 
careful attention” (at [55]). These concerns were supported by the circumstances of Mr 
Appelgren’s statement, in that he was interviewed on the day he appeared in court on a charge of 
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escaping prison, and in the context of seeking a retrial; and he was aware the sole reason for the 
interview was to see if he could assist police with the Red Fox investigation. These circumstances 
“strongly suggest he had a motive to make a false statement”, and raise obvious reliability concerns 
(at [57]). Adding to this, Mr Appelgren had a track record of convictions for dishonesty offences, 
and was purporting to recall a conversation that occurred months prior. Accordingly, the Court in 
the joint appeal found the circumstances relating to his statement did not provide reasonable 
assurance of reliability, and it was excluded under s 18 (at [50]–[60]). 
 
W v R: Reliability and Search Warrant 
 
The reliability of Mr Appelgren’s statement was also at issue in W v R, in which W appealed a pre-
trial decision of Woolford J to admit evidence obtained under a search warrant executed on W’s 
home in January 1988. The application for the warrant was based in part on the information 
contained in Mr Appelgren’s statement that tended to link W and Mr Hoggart to the hold-up. W 
argued, inter alia, that in light of the above Court of Appeal decision finding the circumstances of 
Mr Appelgren’s statement raised reliability concerns, “the cogency of the information in the 
application attributed to Mr Appelgren was diminished” (at [24]).  
The Court dismissed this line of argument, stating that “[s]ubsequent information which may 
tend to cast doubt on an informer’s reliability cannot be taken into account in assessing whether a 
warrant was correctly issued”, and finding that there was “nothing … contained in the application, 
or … otherwise before the issuer, to establish any inherent unreliability known to [the applicant or 
the issuer of the warrant]” (at [25]).  
With respect, this seems rather to gloss over an important issue. It is, of course, true that the 
joint appeal—which determined that Mr Appelgren’s statement had been made in circumstances 
impugning reliability—had not yet been decided when the warrant was issued (a space of 31 years 
separated these two events), the former decision was based largely on the inherent unreliability of 
prison informants (see the joint appeal at [51]–[57]). The fact that Mr Appelgren was a prison 
informant was known to the Justice of the Peace. It is, therefore, incorrect to refer to that fact as 
“subsequent information” tending to cast doubt on reliability (assuming that the Justice would have 
been aware of the unreliability of prison informant evidence, which seems a safe assumption). The 
better approach may have been to acknowledge that a reliability issue was before the Justice, by 
virtue of Mr Appelgren being a prison informant, while deferring (in the absence of any indication 
to the contrary) to the Justice’s factual assessment of overall reliability. This is congruent with the 
above discussed principle that reliability is generally a question for the fact-finder, unless a 
threshold test (such as that in s 18) applies.  
 
CAUSATION AND UNFAIRLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 
Background  
 
On the same day the search warrant was executed, W was located at a farm near Hamilton, 
handcuffed, and taken to the Napier Police Station after a short stop at the Hamilton Police station. 
He was detained for the weekend and interviewed by Detective Sergeant White. During the course 
of the interviews, W made claims as to his whereabouts on the 1987 Labour Weekend, statements 
which the Crown sought to have admitted under s 27 (W v R at [12]). The Crown submitted that 
the statements, being demonstrably untrue, tend to prove guilt (at [12]). 
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In the High Court, W argued the statements were inadmissible on the grounds of being 
unfairly obtained (s 30(5)(c)) (see W v R at [58]). Woolford J was faced with directly conflicting 
accounts between W and the police as to the circumstances of W’s questioning, and made various 
factual findings based in part on an assessment of the witnesses’ credibility and reliability (at [61]). 
Two complaints of unfairness were accepted as proven: 
(a) “The police did not advise W of their intention to question him about the Red Fox 
aggravated robbery and murder” (at [64]) (he was advised he was being questioned about 
a stolen motor vehicle, but Woolford J was satisfied the “real reason” for the interview 
was his possible involvement in the Red Fox hold-up (R v W [2019] NZHC 927 at [22] 
as cited in W v R at [52])). 
(b) “The police did not initially caution him” (W v R at [64]). 
Woolford J was satisfied, however, that there was no causative link between the police failures 
and the statements, as required by s 30(5) (R v W [2019] NZHC 927 at [92] as cited in W v R at 




On appeal, the Court of Appeal reviewed the witness statements and evidence, and agreed with 
Woolford J’s finding that the interview was unfair in the aforementioned two respects (W v R at 
[64]–[65]). However, the Court was split on the question of causation—whether the unfairness 
caused W to make the statements.  
The majority rejected W’s claim that, due to the pressure of the circumstances, he “made 
admissions he would otherwise not have” made (at [83]). Instead, they considered that W was 
taking advantage of the interview to set up an exculpatory alibi, knowing he was a suspect of 
interest in the Red Fox hold-up (at [91]): 
 
W anticipated that he would be sought by the police [in relation to Red Fox] and 
made the conscious choice to provide them with an exculpatory account of his 
movements over the Labour weekend the previous year. Accordingly, his 
statements were not unfairly obtained (emphasis added).  
 
As noted by Stevens J (joining Moore J and writing separately on the issue), a difference of 
view on the question of causation was at the heart of the dissent of Mallon J (at [111]). Moore and 
Stevens JJ reasoned that the voluntary element—W apparently choosing to take advantage of the 
interview to set up a (demonstrably false) alibi—broke any factual or “but for” causation between 
the impropriety and the statements (at [84], [90]–[91] and [132]). Put another way, the argument 
is that the police impropriety is relegated to the status of background in light of W’s voluntary 
choices, which broke the chain of causation (at [132] per Stevens J, borrowing phrasing from 




Mallon J was of the view that the majority’s conclusion was “too speculative on the facts as they 
are known” (W v R at [137]). Instead of focusing on the voluntary element, Mallon J made a 
retrospective, hypothetical assessment of what W would have said if he had been properly advised 
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(at [139]–[146]). Unlike the majority, Mallon J was unwilling to place reliance on the fact that W 
was a “seasoned criminal” who would have been aware of his rights despite the lack of caution (at 
[140]–[143]). She hypothesised that even as a seasoned criminal, it is possible that had he been 
explicitly told of the reason for the interview and reminded of his rights, W would not have made 




Mallon J’s dissent is not inconsistent with the majority’s view that a voluntary choice can break 
the chain of causation between police impropriety and a defendant’s statement. However, in her 
view, on the facts of hand, there was a reasonable chance that that choice would not have been 
made but for the impropriety. Accordingly, the impropriety should not have been “relegated to the 
status of background”. In other words, because the impropriety arguably impacted W’s choices, 
the “voluntary choice” argument was undermined. 
 
SUMMARY 
In sum, the Red Fox Tavern pre-trial admissibility decisions contain important analysis on various 
provisions in the Evidence Act. The most significant points discussed in this case note can be 
summed up as follows: 
• A significant “singular feature” will not necessarily undermine multiple common features 
when assessing the linkage of proposed propensity evidence. 
• Reliability, including due to delay, is generally not relevant to the s 8 probative value 
assessment, other than in exceptional cases. 
• Despite s 27(3), the hearsay rules are properly applied to defendant statements contained 
within a hearsay statement. 
• The reliability assessment of prison informant evidence may differ in the context of search 
warrants (factual question for issuer) versus admissibility of hearsay at trial (legal question 
for judge).  
• The nexus between impropriety and voluntariness is relevant to the s 30 “improperly 
obtained” causation analysis. 
